No required reading.
Reference texts for the entire course (see slides of lecture 1 for a more comprehensive list):
Reading for Lectures 2 and 3:
( Read only pages 286-288)
The classic:
John Nash,
"Non-cooperative Games",
Annals of Mathematics, 1951.
Reference reading for definitions:
Sergiu Hart,
"Games in Extensive and Strategic Form", Chapter 2 of Handbook
of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol I.
(This handbook is
available digitally from the University of Edinburgh Library online. Seach for the "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications", edited by R. Aumann
and S. Hart.)
Supplementary texbook reading for lectures 2 and 3 (not required reading):
[Shoham/Leyton-Brown, Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) book, 2009, Chapter 3].
Light supplementary reading:
"Application to Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies",
from
Philip D. Straffin, "Game Theory and Strategy" (1993), chap. 15, pages 93-99 ** ONLY **.
(This book is
available digitally from the University of Edinburgh Library online. Seach for the author name and the name of the book.)
Supplementary references:
G. Owen, Game Theory, 1982.
Chapter 2, on "2-person zero-sum Games".
V. Chvatal, Linear Programming, 1983.
Chapter 15, on "Matrix Games".
Reading for the next several lectures:
our reference for Linear Programming will be:
V. Chvatal, Linear Programming, 1983.
(Chapters 1-5)
(An electronic copy of this is available to AGTA students via the LEARN page for AGTA, under "Course Materials".)
Reading: continuing with Chvatal, Chapters 1-5.
Reading: continuing with Chvatal, Chapters 1-5.
supplementary reference: chapter 3 of Owen.
Supplementary references:
Pages 235-245 of:
A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory,
1995.
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [sections 3.4.3-3.4.4].
Supplementary references:
R. D. McKelvey and A. McLennan
Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games ,
from Handbook of Computational Economics, vol. I, 1996.
B. Von Stengel, Computing equilibria for two-person games , chapter 45 from Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 3, 2002.
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapter 4].
Reference reading for this and next lecture (same reference as Lec. 2):
Sergiu Hart,
"Games in Extensive and Strategic Form", Chapter 2 of Handbook
of Game Theory, Vol I.
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapter 5].
Supplementary reference:
E. Grädel, W. Thomas, and Th. Wilke (editors),
Automata, Logics, and Infinite Games,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS volume 2500, 2002.
Supplementary references:
M. Puterman Markov Decision Processes: discrete stochastic dynamic
programming, Wiley, 1994.
J. Filar and K. Vrieze,
Competitive Markov Decision Processes, Springer, 1997.
Supplementary reference reading:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 18 and 19.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapter 6, section 6.4].
Supplementary Reference reading for the next few lectures:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 9,11,12 13, and 28.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapters 10 and 11].
Supplementary reference reading for this and the previous lecture:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 9,11,12 13, and 28.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapters 10 and 11].
For general background on market equilibria (and Microeconomic Theory in general), as well as on Mechanism design, see the excellent reference text:
A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory,
1995.
Supplementary reference reading for this and the previous two lectures:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 9,11,12 13, and 28.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapters 10 and 11].
For general background on market equilibria (and Microeconomic Theory in general), as well as on Mechanism design, see the excellent reference text:
A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory,
1995.
For background on matching markets (and multi-item unit-demand auctions), see the
lovely book:
A. Roth and M. Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching: A study in Game-Theoretic
Modeling and Analysis, 1990.
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