No required reading.
Reference texts for the entire course (see slides of lecture 1 for a more comprehensive list):
Reading for Lectures 2 and 3:
( Read only pages 286-288)
The classic:
John Nash,
"Non-cooperative Games",
Annals of Mathematics, 1951.
Reference reading for definitions:
Sergiu Hart,
"Games in Extensive and Strategic Form", Chapter 2 of Handbook
of Game Theory, Vol I.
Supplementary texbook reading for lectures 2 and 3 (not required reading):
[Shoham/Leyton-Brown, Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) book, 2009, Chapter 3].
Light supplementary reading (for fun):
"Application to Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies",
from P. Straffin (1993), chap. 15, pp. 93-99.
Supplementary references:
G. Owen, Game Theory, 1982.
Chapter 2, on "2-person zero-sum Games".
V. Chvatal, Linear Programming, 1983.
Chapter 15, on "Matrix Games".
Reading for the next several lectures:
our reference for Linear Programming will be:
V. Chvatal, Linear Programming, 1983.
(Chapters 1-5)
Reading: continuing with Chvatal, Chapters 1-5.
Reading: continuing with Chvatal, Chapters 1-5.
supplementary reference: chapter 3 of Owen.
Supplementary references:
Pages 235-245 of:
A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory,
1995.
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [sections 3.4.3-3.4.4].
Supplementary references:
R. D. McKelvey and A. McLennan
Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games ,
from Handbook of Computational Economics, vol. I, 1996.
B. Von Stengel, Computing equilibria for two-person games , chapter 45 from Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 3, 2002.
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapter 4].
Reference reading for this and next lecture (same reference as Lec. 2):
Sergiu Hart,
"Games in Extensive and Strategic Form", Chapter 2 of Handbook
of Game Theory, Vol I.
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapter 5].
Supplementary reference:
E. Grädel, W. Thomas, and Th. Wilke (editors),
Automata, Logics, and Infinite Games,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS volume 2500, 2002.
Supplementary references:
M. Puterman Markov Decision Processes: discrete stochastic dynamic
programming, Wiley, 1994.
J. Filar and K. Vrieze,
Competitive Markov Decision Processes, Springer, 1997.
Supplementary reference reading:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 18 and 19.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapter 6, section 6.4].
Supplementary Reference reading for the next few lectures:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 9,11,12 13, and 28.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapters 10 and 11].
Supplementary reference reading for this and the previous lecture:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 9,11,12 13, and 28.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapters 10 and 11].
For general background on market equilibria (and Microeconomic Theory in general), as well as on Mechanism design, see the excellent reference text:
A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory,
1995.
Supplementary reference reading for this and the previous two lectures:
Algorithmic Game Theory, editors N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, Cambridge U. Press, 2007.
(See chapters 9,11,12 13, and 28.)
In [Shoham/Leyton-Brown MAS book] see [Chapters 10 and 11].
For general background on market equilibria (and Microeconomic Theory in general), as well as on Mechanism design, see the excellent reference text:
A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory,
1995.
For background on matching markets (and multi-item unit-demand auctions), see the
lovely book:
A. Roth and M. Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching: A study in Game-Theoretic
Modeling and Analysis, 1990.
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