Inf1 CogSci 2013: Lecture 17: Putting the 'science' in Cognitive Science

Henry S. Thompson
28 February 2013
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1. Introduction: The scientific method

Back on day 1 we said that Cognitive Science was distinguished by its methodology

The word 'science' is itself the name for a methodology

We call it the scientific method

Historically, an attempt to integrate experimentation into 'natural philosophy'

2. Models and theories

A model predicts—A theory explains. [Amos Rapoport]

There is an enormous literature on exactly what this kind of statement means

Two names to recognise

Karl Popper
  • Theories must make testable predictions
  • Theories cannot be proved, only disproved
  • Progress consists in theory refinement/replacement as a result of disproof
Thomas Kuhn
  • Normal science is essentially evolutionary, within a methodological paradigm
  • More rarely, scientific revolution happens when an old paradigm is abandoned in favour of a new one

3. An example from astronomy

Copernicus proposed a heliocentric model of the solar system

Kepler had access to more detailed observations (from Tycho Brahe)

Finally Newton produced an explanation

4. An example from biology

Mendel modelled the inheritance of visible properties of pea plants

His model was composed of pairs of hidden agents (we call them genes)

An explanation for this didn't come for nearly 100 years

And depended on the unification of theories of cell division, genetics and morphogenesis

5. The role of experiments

Often observation and experiments come first

Once we have a model, we can use it to make predictions

Contrast, for example, the Michaelson-Morley experiment with the Einstein-Eddington one

6. An example from cognition

Some models of lexical memory involve some notion of association

Priming is the name for a wide range of reaction time effects

A typical priming experiment involves a lexical decision task

Word frequency and number of meanings have a measurable effect on how fast a word is judged to actually be a word

So does priming

7. Cognitive science, operationalization and reaction times

It seems that everywhere you look in the experimental cognitive science literature, you see reaction times

There's a good reason for this

8. Operationalising runtime

A key value of computational models is that they invite one particularly easy operationalisation

That can't be right: runtime on how fast a computer?

So, the graph everyone wants:

9. Operationalisation, cont'd

Another way to think about operationalisation is to ask

A good old-fashioned map is a kind of model

What kind of claims does it make?

And what doesn't it claim?

10. What is a prediction?

OK, so we have a model, and we've done some operationalisation

We're looking for explanations

So we're looking for one or more aspects of the model we can manipulate

And another aspect we expect to change as a result

And see if that change corresponds to what the model says it should be

11. Dependent and independent variables

In an experiment based on a model, the things we manipulate or measure are called variables

The ones we're trying to explain

The ones we manipulate

So when someone says "We found a significant effect of obesity on morbidity" they mean

12. Correlation is not causation

Where was the model in that imaginary experiment?

Without a model, correlation cannot prove causation