Cryptography in a quantum world

Petros Wallden

School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh

25th October 2016



- What is quantum computation
- Why should we care if quantum computers are constructed? (a crypto view)
- Should we worry?
- Two directions for solving this issue
- An unconditionally secure protocol: Quantum key distribution

What is quantum computation?

- Quantum physics is one of the most successful theories (in terms of theory, accuracy of predictions and applications).
- Quantum systems have strange properties that classical everyday objects do not have. Is probably one of the (conceptually) least understood theories.

Central Question

Can we built a computer using as basic information elements quantum systems, and will this give us extra power?

- Could in principle attempt to construct a computer that basic elements instead of bits are quantum systems (qubits) that behave in this strange way.
- What power would such a machine have? Would it be equally, more or less powerful than normal computers?
- Can we actually built such machines? (What stops us so far is theoretical limitations, practical challenges or both ?)

Bit	Qubit			
Takes values either 0 or 1	Can behave as being simultane-			
	ously 0 and 1: $lpha \left 0 ight angle + eta \left 1 ight angle$			
Measurement reveals the value	Measurement disturbs the sys-			
of the bit	tem			
Can be copied	Cannot be copied			
String of bits are described in	String of qubits can have prop-			
terms of single bits (local)	erties that cannot be described			
	in terms of single qubits (non-			
	local)			
	Qubits behave as waves and			
	"interfere" with each other			

Note: Quantum computers are not faster (in terms of operations per second) BUT use the strange quantum properties and can perform algorithms/operations that are not possible with a classical computer.

Why should we care?

Quantum Computation

- Physics simulations
- Breaking cryptography?
- Machine learning
- Data mining
- Distributed computation
- Advances in classical computation
- And more ...

Quantum Cryptography

- Key distribution
- Secure authentication
- Digital signatures
- Secure computation
- Quantum money
- Advances in classical cryptography
- And more...

"For me, the single most important application of a quantum computer is disproving the people who said it's impossible. The rest is just icing on the cake" Scott Aaronson

Why should we care?

- There exists algorithm for a quantum computer, that efficiently solves factoring and discrete log (Shor's algorithm).
- Actually all the intractable problems given in Lecture 12 (Factoring, RSAP, Discrete Log, DHP) become tractable with quantum computers!
- Most, currently used, cryptographic protocols are based on the assumption that these problems are hard.
- Quantum computers can solve efficiently (class BQP) a larger class of problems than classical computers. BQP is less explored and so our belief on the hardness of problems for quantum computers is not so well founded.

Take-home message

If a scalable quantum computer is built, most of current cryptography breaks (from emails, bank transactions to national security secrets)!

- There is no theoretical reason that rules out quantum computers
- <u>State of Art</u>:
 - 2001 Shor's algorithm factors 15 on 7 qubits
 - **2011** Shor's algorithm factors 21
 - 2012 Universal quantum computation on 2 fault tolerant qubits
 - 2014-2015 Qubits and gates in silicon chips
 - **2015** D-Wave 2X, 1000 qubits, optimization problems, no fault tolerance
 - **2016** IBM, universal quantum computation on 5 fault tolerant qubits (publicly available)
 - 2020 NQIT, Q20:20, fault tolerant (20 qubits), scalable
- However (1) current implementations are (in principle) scalable, (2) there is a recent initiative with major funding from governments (U.K., EU, USA, Canada, Australia, China, etc) and leading companies (Google, IBM, etc) worldwide.



€1 Billion Quantum Project planned for 2018

23rd May 2016

The European Commission has announced plans to launch a €1 billion project to boost a raft of quantum technologies; from secure communication networks to ultra-precise gravity sensors and clocks.

The initiative, to launch in 2018, will be similar in size, timescale and ambition to two existing projects; the decade-long Graphene Flagship and the Human Brain Project.

The commission is likely to have a "substantial role" in funding the flagship, according to Tommaso Calarco, who leads the Integrated Quantum Science and Technology Centre at the Universities of Ulm and Stuttgart in Germany. Calarco co-author of the Quantum Manifesto insists "Countries around the world are investing in these technologies. Without such an initiative, Europe risks becoming a second-tier player. The time is really now or never."

Quantum Buzz

High-profile US companies are already investing in quantum computing and Chinese scientists are nearing the completion of a 2,000-kilometre long quantum-communication link – the longest in the world – to send information securely between Beijing and Shanghai.

(日) (同) (三) (三)

• Not all hype is based on facts



Petros Wallden

Cryptography in a quantum world

• We should be careful when reading news



Take-home message

There is a serious medium-time threat that scalable quantum computers will become available.

- No need to panic
- Need to plan NOW how to make communications secure against adversaries that have a quantum computer or that have quantum technological abilities.

Solution 1: Post-quantum cryptography

- Construct crypto protocols that their security is based on the hardness of problems that are hard even for a quantum computer.
- Example of such problems are the "lattice-based" cryptography. However the belief that those problems are indeed hard for quantum computer is not as well founded as in the classical algorithms.

In short, it is difficult to base all protocols on these problems, is not certain that they are quantum-hard and there is always the possibility that some computation model could break this at some point (e.g. using new "quantum gravity" physics).

• A quantum adversary can:

(a) just use his quantum computer to solve a problem in the protocol or

(b) use his/her quantumness to perform more involved attacks at other steps of the protocol (i.e. reduction of security to the hard problem may not hold).

Post-quantum need to take into account both issues!

• In involved protocols (e.g. zero knowledge proofs), proof technique may need to be modified (e.g. copying is impossible).

- Use quantum properties (no-cloning, measurements disturbs the state, monogamy of entanglement, non-locality, etc) to achieve higher level of security ("unconditional" security)
- This does not rely on computational hardness and thus will be secure against adversaries having a quantum computer (or even an arbitrarily powerful computer).
- Main (and most developed) example: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).
- Can exploit quantumness to achieve an even more exciting level of security (device-independent cryptography). In this case, the parties do not even trust their own devices!
- This is not a fiction as it is much easier to implement than a quantum computer. E.g. was used in actual elections in Switzerland in 2007.

- Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
- Unconditionally secure
- 1Mbps over 20km
- 12.7Kbps over 307km
- SwissQuantum (2009-2011)
- Tokyo (2010)







- QKD backbone
- To be completed 2016
- QuantumCTek
- Commercial and government use



- QKD network
- To be completed
- Battelle and ID Quantique
- Commercial and government use



HOME > QUANTUM-SAFE CRYPTO

Quantum-Safe Crypto

ID Quantique provides high-performance network encryption solutions for the protection of data in transit. DO's encryption platform car encrypt high throughput traffic up to 100Gbps on local and storage area networks for data back-up and recovery, as well as on hilly meshed global WAN networks for international operations.

IDQ uses state-of-the-art algorithms and highly secure quantum key generation and quantum key distribution (quantum cryptography), ensuing that the solutions are "quantum-safe" for the long-term protection of sensitive data into and beyond the quantum era.

CENTAURIS CN8000

MULTI-LINK, MULTI-PROTOCOL 100G DATA CENTER ENCRYPTION



CENTAURIS LINK ENCRYPTORS

HIGH PERFORMANCE ETHERNET & FIBRE CHANNEL ENCRYPTION

ARCIS MPLS AND CLOUD ENCRYPTION





• 1 mm

Contact

TEL: +41 22 301 83 71 EMAIL: info@idquantique.com

Name Company Email Phone ARRANGE & CALL BACK
Name Company Email Phone
Name Company Email
Name Company
Name

RESOURCE CENTRE

イロト イポト イヨト イヨト

CERBERIS

QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION SERVER



э

- Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984 gave the first QKD protocol
- Followed "quantum money" paper (Stephen Wiesner)
- Set of states $\{|H\rangle, |+\rangle, |V\rangle, |-\rangle\}$ $|\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|H\rangle \pm |V\rangle)$
- Alice encodes the classical bit 0 with either $|H\rangle$ or $|+\rangle$ and the classical bit 1 with either $|V\rangle$ or $|-\rangle$
- Alice sends a string qubits corresponding to an equal length string of classical bits
 - E.g. $|H\rangle |+\rangle |-\rangle |H\rangle |V\rangle$ corresponding to the string 00101
- Bob randomly chooses either the basis $x_0 = \{|H\rangle, |V\rangle\}$ or the basis $x_1 = \{|+\rangle, |-\rangle\}$ and makes a measurement. He records the (classical) outcome $\{0, 1\}$ and the basis $\{x_0, x_1\}$ he measured
- Bob announces the basis x_i he measured (NOT the outcome)
- Alice responds for which qubits Bob measured at the correct basis
- Alice and Bob discard all the qubits that Bob measured in the wrong basis

- For the remaining qubits, if no eavesdropping has occurred and no noise (ideal case), Alice and Bob should agree 100%. This is called the **raw key**
- They choose a small fraction (e.g. 10%) of the bits and check if they have any disagreements This phase, where Alice and Bob find what fraction of mismatches they have, is called **Parameter Estimation** (PE) phase
- The qubits that are used in the PE phase are also discarded ("sacrifice" some part of the string to establish what correlation Alice has with Bob)
- The remaining bits (after discarding positions that Bob measured at the wrong basis and those that were used at the PE phase) will be used for distilling a secret key
- In the ideal case (no noise), the latter is exactly the secret key that Alice and Bob share
- Neither Alice nor Bob can decide what key they will share by the end. Therefore QKD *generates* a secret key rather than distributes.

• Example:

Key Encoding (Alice)	$egin{array}{c} 0 \ H angle \end{array}$	$ +\rangle$	- angle	$egin{array}{c} 1 \ V angle \end{array}$	$ +\rangle$
Measurement (Bob) Outcome Key Obtained	$egin{array}{c} x_0 \ H angle \ 0 \end{array}$	$x_0 X \\ V\rangle \\ 1 X$	$egin{array}{c} x_1 \ - angle \ 1 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} x_1 X \\ -\rangle \\ 1 X \end{array}$	$ \begin{array}{c} x_0 X \\ V\rangle \\ 1X \end{array} $

- Eve cannot copy the states (quantum no-cloning)
- Eve cannot measure the qubit without disturbing it! Any attempt to obtain information increases the number of errors in the PE phase
- In general Alice, Bob and Eve have strings X, Y, W. If X is more correlated with Y than with W, then there is a way to distil a perfectly secret identical string
- The above correlations can be bound from the observed errors in PE.

 There exist other attacks, that try to exploit the imperfections of the implementations. Active research in improving security! And an image of a quantum hacker, exactly as you would imagine him:



(Prof. Vadim Makarov from University of Waterloo)

- Quantum computers would break existing cryptography
- Progress towards building quantum computers has been made
- Is necessary to address this threat
- Either change classical protocols to make them hard for quantum computers
- Or use quantumness to have higher level of security: Quantum key distribution