Cryptographic protocols (II)

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Credit card payment protocol

Credit card payment

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- Is it a real card?

Credit card payment

- Is it a real card?
- Is the pin protected?

Behavior in the usual case

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   If the amount m is greater than 100 euros (and in only 20% of the cases)
   4.1 The terminal asks for authentication of the card
   4.2 The bank provides authentication

More details

4 actors: Bank, Customer, Card, and Terminal

Bank owns:

- a secret signing key sk_B
- a public verification key pk_B
- a secret symmetric encryption key per card K_{CB}

Card owns:

- Data: last name, first name, card's number, expiration date
- Signature's value $VS = \{\mathsf{hash}(Data)\}_{\mathsf{sk}_B}$
- a secret symmetric encryption shared with the bank K_{CB}

Terminal owns:

- the public verification key pk_B

Credit card payment protocol (in short)

The terminal reads the card:

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$$\begin{array}{lllll} 2. & T & \rightarrow & Cu & : \ \text{pin?} \\ 3. & Cu & \rightarrow & Ca & : \ 1234 \\ 4. & Ca & \rightarrow & T & : \ \text{ok} \end{array}$$

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The terminal calls the bank

$$\begin{array}{lllll} 5. & T & \rightarrow & B & : \text{auth?} \\ 6. & B & \rightarrow & T & : N_B \\ 7. & T & \rightarrow & Ca & : N_B \\ 8. & Ca & \rightarrow & T & : \{N_B\}_{K_{Cb}} \\ 9. & T & \rightarrow & B & : \{N_B\}_{K_{Cb}} \\ 10. & B & \rightarrow & T & : \text{ok} \end{array}$$

Some flaws

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$\Rightarrow$ "YesCard" built by Serge Humpich (France, 1998)

How does the "YesCard" work?

Logical flaw

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$\longrightarrow$ creation of a fake card

$$
\begin{array}{llcll}
1. & Ca' & \rightarrow & T & : \; XXXX, \{\mathrm{hash}(XXXX)\}_{\mathsf{sk}_B} \\
2. & T & \rightarrow & Cu' & : \; \mathrm{pin?} \\
3. & Cu' & \rightarrow & Ca' & : \; 0000 \\
4. & Ca' & \rightarrow & T & : \; \mathrm{ok}
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$$

The SSL/TLS protocol

SSL/TLS protocol

Goals: Confidentiality, Integrity, Non repudiation



SSL/TLS use X.509 certificates and hence asymmetric cryptography to exchange a symmetric key. This session key is then used to encrypt subsequent communication. This allows for **data/message confidentiality**, and message authentication codes for **message integrity** and thus, **message authentication**.

SSL/TLS protocol



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

TCP/IP protocol stack



- TCP/IP provides end-to-end connectivity and is organized into four abstraction layers which are used to sort all related protocols according to the scope of networking involved
- The SSL/TLS library operates above the transport layer (uses TCP) but below application protocols

SSL/TLS protocol layers



SSL/TLS handshake protocol



SSL/TLS renegotiation

Client and server are allowed to initiate renegotiation of the session encryption in order to:

- Refresh keys
- Increase authentication
- Increase cipher strength
- ...

Client or server can trigger renegotiation by sending a hello meesage

SSL/TLS renegotiation weaknesses

- Renegotiation has priority over application data!
- Renegotiation can take place in the middle of an application layer transaction!



(Detailed on the board)

Incorrect implicit assumtion: the client doesn't change through renegotiation

Marsh Ray's plaintext injection attack on HTTPS

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⇒ **Server uses victim's account to send a pizza to attacker!**

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$\Rightarrow$ **the attacker gets the user name and password of the victim!**

The SAML Signle Sign On (SSO) protocol

SAML SSO protocol



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

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

SAML SSO protocol (OASIS 2005)



Google's implementation of SSO

Google's SAML-based Single Sign-On for Google Applications deviates from the above protocol for a few, seemingly minor simplifications in the messages exchanged:

G1. *ID* and *SP* are not included in the authentication assertion, *i.e.* $AA = \text{AuthAssert}(C; IdP)$ instead of $\text{AuthAssert}(ID; C; IdP; SP)$;

G2. *ID*, *SP* and *IdP* are not included in the response, *i.e.* $Resp = \text{Response}(\{AA\}_{K_{IdP}^{-1}})$ instead of $\text{Response}(ID; SP; IdP; \{AA\}_{K_{IdP}^{-1}})$.

Attack Google's SSO implementation

[A. Armando, R. Carbone, L. Compagna, J. Cullar, L. Tobarra, "Formal analysis of SAML 2.0 web browser single sign-on: breaking the SAML-based single sign-on for google apps", (FMSE'08)]



Legend:

$A \xrightarrow[ch]{M}\bullet\ B$: A sends M on ch confidential to B

$A\ \bullet\!\xrightarrow[ch]{M} B$: A sends M on ch authentic for A

$A\ \bullet\!\xrightarrow[ch]{M}\bullet\ B$: M is sent on ch authentic for A and confidential to B

SAML SSO protocol (OASIS 2012)



Attack SAML SSO protocol (OASIS 2012)

[A. Armando, R. Carbone, L. Compagna, J. Cullar, G. Pellegrino, A. Sorniotti, "From Multiple Credentials to Browser-Based Single Sign-On: Are We More Secure?", Chapter in Future Challenges in Security and Privacy for Academia and Industry]



⇒ XSS attack on SAML-base SSO for Google Apps