Secure Programming Lecture 1: Introduction

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This course is **Secure Programming**.

More accurately: it is about **Software Security**.

Aimed at Informatics **MSc and 4th/5th year**

Primarily: those anticipating a career in software

- **programming**: architects, developers, testers, . . .
- **security**: pentesters, malware/reverse engineers
- **researchers**: verification, compilers, languages, . . .

It is taught by **David Aspinall**.

Public home page:
http://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/teaching/courses/sp

The **Learn page** has links to the lecture recordings (UoE only).
Outline

Recent motivations
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Summary
Ubiquitous software is broken (2014)
Ubiquitous hardware is flawed (2018)
Old systems break operations (2017)

NHS cyber-attack: GPs and hospitals hit by ransomware

13 May 2017
Attacks can cause physical damage (2014)

Hack attack causes 'massive damage' at steel works

22 December 2014

The hack attack led to failures in plant equipment and forced the fast shut down of a furnace.
Federal Union Says OPM Data Breach Hit Every Single Federal Employee
Known good practice ignored (2015)

**NEWS**

TalkTalk discloses possible breach, admits some data not encrypted

A woman walks past a company logo outside a TalkTalk building in London, Britain October 23, 2015. Credit: REUTERS/Stefan Wermuth
IoT easily raises a DDoS botnet army (2016)
Why does this happen?

Ostensibly, **many security failures are due to software vulnerabilities**. Are they inevitable?

Many surrounding questions. Can we:

- *find* vulnerabilities (before attacks)?
- *detect* exploits in-the-wild?
- *repair* vulnerabilities (routinely/automatically)?
- *program better* to avoid vulnerabilities?
- *measure risk* associated with software?
- *design* or *verify* to prevent them?
- *develop new technology* to help the above?

Questions beyond the technical, too. Can we:

- *insure* against cyber incidents?
- *regulate* for better security?
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What is this course about?

Building software that’s more secure

- finding flaws in existing software
- avoiding flaws in new software (design and code)
- techniques, tools and understanding to do this

The *infrastructure* around secure software:

- language, libraries, run-time; other programs
- data storage, distribution, protocols and APIs
- development and deployment methods

And first of all, setting *policies* for security

- what should be protected
- who/what is trusted
- risk assessment: cost of defences.
Target audience

- Aimed at MSc, 4th/5th year UGs
- Have passed *Computer Security* or similar
  - Basic notions, crypto, protocols
- **Programming practice**
  - should be confident in programming
  - necessarily will use a range of languages
  - . . . including assembler, C, Java
  - but don’t have be “master hacker”
  - grounded in software engineering
- **Programming theory**
  - interest in PL concepts and design
  - knowledge of *compilers* useful
  - also software engineering, esp, *testing*
  - theory courses helpful, *semantics*
Why should you take this course?

Want to work in the **cyber security industry**?

- security appraisal, system and code reviewing
- pen-testing, ethical hacking
- malware analysis, reverse engineering
- operations and response (SOCs)
- cyber defence, attack, espionage
- innovation: found a cyber start-up

Want to work in **security research**?

- academic (conceptual advances, fixing, breaking)
- commercial (breaking, fixing, defending)

(Hopefully): you think it’s **fun and interesting**!
Why should you not take this course?

- None of the previous points apply
- You don’t have the right background (see next slide)
- Perhaps: you know (almost all of) it already

Warning: We try to keep the course up-to-date so it is sometimes “rough at the edges”.
Expected background

Please see Guide to Background Needed on course homepage.

1. Security properties: C, I, A, non-repudiation, privacy
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4. **Coding** skills and problem solving
5. **Practicals**: command line Linux
Learning outcomes

1. Know how to respond to (software) security alerts.
2. Identify possible security programming errors when conducting code reviews.
3. Be able to define a methodology for security testing and use appropriate tools in its implementation.
4. Apply new security-enhanced programming models and tools which help ensure security goals, e.g., with access control, information flow tracking, protocol implementation, or atomicity enforcement.
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Safety is concerned with ensuring bad things don’t happen *accidently*. For example, aeroplanes don’t fall out of the sky because maintenance checks are forgotten.

Security is concerned with ensuring that bad things don’t happen because of *malicious actions by others*. For example, terrorists cannot drive bombs into airport departure halls.

The distinction is sometimes blurred, and the two interact in intriguing ways. (**Q. why?**
The challenge of software security

Software artefacts are among the most complex built.

- Design flaws are likely
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- **Design flaws** are likely
- **Bugs** seem inevitable
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Flaws and bugs lead to vulnerabilities which are exploited by attackers.

Often to learn secrets, obtain money. But many other reasons: a security risk assessment for a system should consider different attackers and their motives.
THE COST OF CYBER CRIME.

A DETICA REPORT IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE OFFICE OF CYBER SECURITY AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE IN THE CABINET OFFICE.
But it’s agreed they’re increasing...
Cyber warfare is real
Privacy is being eroded

A privacy reminder from Google

Scroll down and click "I agree" when you're ready to continue or explore other options on this page.

To be consistent with data protection laws, we're asking you to take a moment to review key points of Google's Privacy Policy. This isn't about a change we've made—it's just a chance to review some key points.

Data we process when you use Google

- When you search for a restaurant on Google Maps or watch a video on YouTube, we process information about that activity— including information such as the video you watched, device IDs, IP addresses, cookie data and location.
- We also process the kind of information described above when you use that use Google services like ads, Analytics and the YouTube video player.
But maybe there is hope...
Why isn’t software security better?

What if Microsoft breaches its warranty? If Microsoft breaches its limited warranty, your only remedy is the repair or replacement of the software. We also have the option to refund to you the price you paid for the software (if any) instead of repairing or replacing it. Prior to refund, you must uninstall the software and return it to Microsoft, with proof of purchase.

What if Microsoft breaches any part of this agreement? If you have any basis for recovering damages from Microsoft, you can recover only direct damages up to the amount that you paid for the software (or up to $50 USD if you acquired the software for no charge). You may not recover any other damages, including consequential, lost profits, special, indirect, or incidental damages. The damage exclusions and limitations in this agreement apply even if repair, replacement or a refund for the software does not fully compensate you for any losses or if Microsoft knew or should have known about the possibility of the damages. Some states and countries do not allow the exclusion or limitation of incidental, consequential, or other damages, so those limitations or exclusions may not apply to you. If your local law allows you to recover other damages from Microsoft even though this agreement does not, you cannot recover more than you paid for the software (or up to $50 USD if you acquired the software for no charge.)
Why (else) isn’t software security better?

- Asymmetry: attackers have the advantage
  - just need to find one viable attack route
  - defenders have to anticipate all
- Attackers focus on weakest links:
  - since 1990s, network defences vastly improved
  - rise of insider threats
- Current *penetrate-and-patch* approach is broken
  - understandable by managers (“show me the problem!”)
  - but no substitute for secure design
What’s the outlook?

New frontiers:

- PCs in decline, but connected devices increasing
- Mobile new target point (convergence, mobility)
- Internet of Things: repeating same mistakes!
- Cloud: XaaS, storage
- Cyber resilience: speedy, automatic recovery
- Data sharing and its limits: **privacy**

Emerging new solutions:

- *Build Security In, Secure By Design*
- Defensive technologies continuing to evolve
- New cryptographic, verification techniques
- Old ideas re-appear: MLS, containment, isolation
- Updates: automatic, pushed patching
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Delivery and assessment

We will have

- **16-18** lectures covering core course topics

Lecture *slides* will be made available in several formats. They *have numerous embedded links* to useful resources (the links are more noticeable in the online versions).

Lecture *recordings* will be available, systems permitting. These are intended as a *backup*. 
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Lab sessions

Five 2hr lab sessions (see home page):

- Weeks 3, 5, 7, 9, 11: **Fri 2pm-5pm**

Each session will examine software vulnerabilities: why they *exist*, how they can be *discovered, exploited, and repaired*.

**Working together is encouraged.** We want to foster a supportive learning environment. Students who have prior knowledge or expertise are especially welcome.

We use the **SEED Labs** developed at Syracuse University, New York. They are free to access for your own use.
One reason to introduce labs in this course is to allow us to give face-to-face discussion and feedback on your learning.

Lab sessions will be run by me together with the course demonstrators and TA (TBC).
Coursework

The coursework will be an assignment following a similar pattern to the lab exercises: *discover, exploit* then *repair*.

1. as usual: **your work should be your own**
2. **no publication**, please do not publish solutions even after the deadline

(at least two reasons for last point).

The coursework deadline is provisionally scheduled for Week 8.
An ethical point (reminder)

Nothing in this course is intended as incitement to crack into running systems!

- Breaking into systems to “demonstrate” security problems at best causes a headache to overworked sysadmins, at worst compromises systems for many users and could lead to prosecution.
- If you spot a security hole in a running system, don’t exploit it, instead contact the relevant administrators or developers confidentially.
- To experiment with security holes, play with your own machine, or better, your own private network of machines.
Communications

- Fast moving, evolving course:
  - honest, constructive feedback is very welcome
- As with any course, I welcome
  - questions after lectures
  - questions by email
  - questions on Piazza
Exam

Will follow the format:

- Choose 2 questions to answer from 3
- Two hours allowed

Towards the end of the course I will provide:

- a list of topics and concepts that may be examined
- a hint about the format of the questions

There is some guidance on the web along with a sample question.
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Dimensions: practice and theory

**Practice**

- Programming securely, identifying security issues
- Mistakes in language, APIs, crypto, comms.
- Ultimately: *detailed, highly specific* knowledge

**Theory**

- Understand reasons for failure, ways to mitigate
- Understand advanced techniques, automated tools
- In general: *transferable* concepts and methods.

This is not really a “vocational” course. I hope it will give you the foundation to allow you to *rapidly develop* detailed specific knowledge needed later. There are a number of certification schemes for building practical knowledge.
Overview of topics

General organisation:

1. Threats
2. Vulnerabilities
3. Defences
4. Processes
5. Emerging Methods

We’ll look at details under each of these headings (in various orders).
1. Threats

- What attackers want, can do
- Types of bad code: malware, spyware, PUPs
- How bad code gets in
- Classification of vulnerabilities and weaknesses, CVE/CWEs
2. Vulnerabilities

- Overflows
- Injections
- Information leaks
- Race conditions
- Side channels and covert channels
3. Defences

- Protection mechanisms: validation, diversification, monitoring
- Trade-offs in adding protection mechanisms
- Provision for recovery
4. Processes

- Secure design principles
- Testing and reviewing to find vulnerabilities
- Assessing/measuring security of code
5. Emerging methods

- Methods and tools to find problems
- Detecting buggy patterns automatically
- Building security in, methodology and technology
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Review questions

Safety versus Security

▶ Explain the difference between these two, and why ensuring security may be harder.

Security flaws and their impact on society.

▶ Explain some recent secure programming flaws that made the news and explain what the underlying problems were.
▶ Discuss the fundamental reasons that software security fails and the wider questions around cyber security.
References and reading

The slides contain links which you can click on to find referenced or connected material.

References and reading will also be given for each lecture in a separate web page for that lecture. For this lecture, see here.

There is no single recommended course textbook, although a few books will be mentioned. See the page above for pointers.