Outline

Roadmap

Memory corruption vulnerabilities

Instant Languages and Runtimes

Instant C and x86 Assembler

Stack overflows

Summary
Security is considered at different stages in the Secure Software Development Life Cycle (SSDLC). The overall phases are:

1. Design
2. Implementation
3. Deployment

We focus mainly on the **coding** stage.
This course emphasises *removing and avoiding vulnerabilities* in software rather than crafting exploits to break code, or using *digital forensics* to discover what happened after-the-fact.

But insight into exploits is needed to understand the reason for vulnerabilities.

It also helps to how and why defensive programming practices and tools work.

*Question.* Can you think of other reasons why a (white hat) security researcher might need to work on exploits?
Roadmap: Kinds of vulnerability

Software vulnerabilities fall into categories, for example:

- memory corruption errors
- injection
- broken authentication
- bad cryptography

and others. We’ll look at vulnerability taxonomies later.
Outline

Roadmap

Memory corruption vulnerabilities

Instant Languages and Runtimes

Instant C and x86 Assembler

Stack overflows

Summary
Memory corruption vulnerabilities

This lecture begins our look at code vulnerabilities, starting with **memory corruption**.

Memory corruption vulnerabilities let the attacker cause the program to write to areas of memory (or write certain values) that the programmer did not intend.

In the worst cases, these can lead to **arbitrary command execution** under the attacker’s control.

We examine **vulnerabilities**, **exploits**, **defences** and **repair**.
Reasons for memory corruption

Memory corruption vulnerabilities arise from possible:

- buffer overflows, in different places
  - stack overflows
  - heap overflows
- other programming mistakes
  - pointer arithmetic mistakes
  - type confusion errors
The nuts and bolts

We begin with classic stack overflows.
Most of you have seen examples of this already.
The idea is to bring everyone to the same point, so we give some “instant” background.

*If you don’t know these details already, this lecture will indicate where you should study more.*

Make sure you understand Lectures 3, 4 and 5 before Lab 2. If you have only studied high-level programming languages before you should spend time on this or you will find the lab difficult.
Outline

Roadmap

Memory corruption vulnerabilities

Instant Languages and Runtimes

Instant C and x86 Assembler

Stack overflows

Summary
Programming in C or assembler

- Low-level programs manipulate memory directly
- Advantage: efficient, precise
- Disadvantage: easy to violate data abstractions
  - arbitrary access to memory
  - pointers and \textbf{pointer arithmetic}
  - mistakes violate \textit{memory safety}

Memory safety

A programming language or analysis tool is said to enforce \textit{memory safety} if it ensures that reads and writes stay within clearly defined memory areas, belonging to different parts of the program. Memory areas are often delineated with \textit{types} and a \textit{typing discipline}. 
Von Neumann programming model

- **Von Neumann model:**
  - *code and data are the same stuff*

- **Von Neumann architecture**
  - implements this in hardware
  - helped revolution in Computing 1950s–1970s

- **But has drawbacks:**
  - data path and control path overloaded (bottleneck)
  - code/data abstraction blurred
  - **self-modifying code** not always safe...
Close to the metal

**Question.** What are the *trusted* bits of code in this picture? In what way do we trust them?
Further from the metal

**Question.** What are the *trusted* bits of code in this picture? In what way do we trust them?
Processes and memory

A process is a running program managed by the operating system.

Processes are organised into several memory areas:

1. **Code** where the compiled program (or shared libraries) reside.
2. **Data** where non-local program variables are stored. This contains *global* or *static* variables and the program *heap* for dynamically allocated data.
3. **Stack** which records dynamically allocated data for each of the currently executing functions/methods. This includes *local* variables, the *current object* reference and the *return address*.

The OS (with the CPU, language runtime) can provide varying amounts of *protection* between these areas.
Outline

Roadmap

Memory corruption vulnerabilities

Instant Languages and Runtimes

Instant C and x86 Assembler

Stack overflows

Summary
Instant C programming

- You should know Java. C uses a similar syntax.
- It has no objects but
  - **pointers** to memory locations (&val, *ptr)
  - arbitrary-length strings, terminated with ASCII NUL
  - fixed-size **structs** for records of values
  - explicit dynamic allocation with malloc()
- It has no exceptions but
  - function return code **conventions**
- Is generally more relaxed
  - about type errors
  - uninitialised variables
- But modern compilers give strong **warnings**
  - these days, errors by default
  - can instrument C code with debug/defence code
#include <stdio.h>

void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    int c;
    printf("Number of arguments passed: %d
", argc);
    for (c = 0 ; c < argc ; c++) {
        printf("Argument %d is: %s
", c, argv[c]);
    }
}
$ gcc showargs.c -o showargs
$ ./showargs this is my test
Number of arguments passed: 5
Argument 0 is: ./showargs
Argument 1 is: this
Argument 2 is: is
Argument 3 is: my
Argument 4 is: test
$
```c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>

typedef struct list { int hd; struct list *tl; } list_t;

void printlist(list_t *l) {
    while (l != NULL) {
        printf("%i\n",l->hd); l=l->tl;
    }
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    int c; list_t *cell = NULL;
    for (c = argc-1; c > 0; c--) {
        list_t *newcell = malloc(sizeof(list_t));
        (*newcell).hd = (int)(strlen(argv[c]));
        newcell->tl = cell;
        cell = newcell;
    }
    if (cell != NULL) printlist(cell);
}```
### Exercise.

If you haven’t programmed C before, try these examples and some others simple programs from a textbook. Write a program to reverse its list of argument words.
Instant assembler programming

- **x86**: hundreds of instructions! But in families:
  - Data movement: **MOV** . . .

- General registers are split into pieces:
  - 32 bits: **EAX** (extended A)
  - 16 bits: **AX**
  - 8 bits: **AH AL** (high and low bytes of A)

- Others are pointers to segments, index offsets
  - **ESP**: stack pointer
  - **EBP**: base pointer (aka frame pointer)
  - **ESI, EDI**: source, destination index register

(We’ll stick to x86 32-bit instructions in this course, 64-bit is slightly different).
Here is a file movc.c:

```c
int value;
int *ptr;

void main() {
    value = 7;
    ptr = &value;
    *ptr = value * 13;
}
```

Compile this to assembly code with:

```
$ gcc showargs.c -S -m32 movc.c
```

This produces a file movc.s shown next.
Instant assembler programming

.data
value:
    .long 2
ptr:
    .long 2
.text
  movl $7, %eax ; set EAX to 7
  movw %ax, value ; value is now 7
  movl $value, ptr ; set ptr = address of value
  movl ptr, %ecx ; ECX to same
  movl value, %edx ; EDX = 7
  movl %edx, %eax ; EAX = 7
  addl %eax, %eax ; EAX = 14 (2*7)
  addl %edx, %eax ; EDX = 7 + 14 = 21
  sall $2, %eax ; EAX = 21 * 4 = 84 (12 * 7)
  addl %edx, %eax ; EAX = 7 + 84 = 91 (13 * 7)
  movl %eax, (%ecx) ; set value = 91

Exercise. If you haven’t looked at assembly programs before, compile some small C programs and try to understand the compiled assembler, at least roughly.
Outline

Roadmap

Memory corruption vulnerabilities

Instant Languages and Runtimes

Instant C and x86 Assembler

Stack overflows

Summary
Fun and profit

- Stack overflow attacks were first carefully explained in *Smashing the stack for fun and profit*, a paper written by Aleph One for the hacker’s magazine *Phrack*, issue 49, in 1996.

- Stack overflows are mainly relevant for C, C++ and other unsafe languages with raw memory access (e.g., pointers and *pointer arithmetic*).

- Languages with built-in *memory safety* such as Java, C#, Python, etc, are immune to the worst attacks — *providing* their language runtimes and native libraries have no exploitable flaws.
The malicious argument overwrites all of the space allocated for the buffer, all the way to the return address location. The return address is altered to point back into the stack, somewhere before the attack code. Typically, the attack code executes a shell.
How the stack works

- Recall **Abstract Data Type** (encapsulation) principles:
  - access to data possible only by ADT operations
  - only data built via operations can be represented
- Recall the **stack** Abstract Data Type, a first-in first-out queue:
  - push(X): add an element X to the top
  - pop(): remove and return the top element
How the stack works

The **program stack** (aka **function stack**, **runtime stack**) holds **stack frames** (aka **activation records**) for each function that is invoked.

- Very common mechanism for high-level language implementation
- So has special CPU support
  - **stack pointer** registers: on x86, **ESP**
  - **frame pointer** registers: on x86, **EBP**
  - Push and pop machine instructions
- Exact mechanisms vary by CPU, OS, language, compiler, compiler flags.

NB: in pictures, some authors draw stacks growing upwards on the page! I will draw stacks that grow downwards.
How the stack works

↑ high addresses

Stack

↓ low addresses

Memory

Data

Code
fun1 has two arguments arg1 and arg2.

- Actual parameters may be passed to the function body on the stack or in registers; the precise mechanism is called the **calling convention**.

fun1 has two local variables buffer and i

- Local variables are allocated space on the stack.

A **frame pointer** may be used to help locate arguments and local variables.
Frame pointers

frame for main()

frame for fun1()
Assembly code for function calls

Let’s see assembly code produced by gcc compiling C programs on Linux (32 bit x86), using gcc  -S.

```c
int main() {
    return 0;
}
```

produces:

```assembly
main:
    pushl %ebp          ; save EBP, the old frame pointer
    movl %esp, %ebp     ; the new frame pointer for body of main()
    movl $0, %eax       ; the return value in EAX
    popl %ebp           ; restore the old frame pointer
    ret
```
void fun1(char arg1, int arg2) {
    char *buffer[5];
    int i;
    *buffer[0] = (char)i;
}

void main() {
    fun1('a',77);
    fun1('a',77);
}
### fun1:

```assembly
pushl %ebp ; save previous frame pointer
movl %esp, %ebp ; set new frame pointer
subl $36, %esp ; allocate enough space for locals
movl -24(%ebp), %eax ; EAX = address of buffer[0]
movl -4(%ebp), %edx ; EDX = i
movb %dl, (%eax) ; Set buffer[0] to be low byte of i
leave ; drop frame
ret ; return
```

### main:

```assembly
pushl %ebp ; save previous frame pointer
movl %esp, %ebp ; set new frame pointer
subl $8, %esp ; allocate space for fun1 parameters
movl $77, 4(%esp) ; store arg2
movl $97, (%esp) ; store arg1 (ASCII 'a')
call fun1 ; invoke fun1
leave ; drop frame
ret ; return
```

**Exercise.** Draw the detailed layout of the stack when the frame for ‘fun1()‘ is active.
Outline

Roadmap

Memory corruption vulnerabilities

Instant Languages and Runtimes

Instant C and x86 Assembler

Stack overflows

Summary
Review questions

**Program execution**

- Explain the points of trust that exist when a Linux user runs a program by executing a binary file.

**Buffer overflows**

- How do they arise?
- In what sense are some languages considered immune from buffer overflow attacks?

**Runtime stack basics**

- Describe how function parameters and local variables are allocated on the runtime stack.
- Write a C program with two nested function calls, compile it to x86 assembler and explain the code.
Next time

We’ll continue looking at the detail of stack and buffer overflow exploits.

**Tomorrow, 10am-1pm AT 6.06**: Lab 1 (“Basic Stuff”). An introduction to command line Linux tools, access control users and groups, compiling C programs, disassembly and debugging, memory layout and allocation.