

## Secure Programming Lecture 2: Landscape

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
15th January 2016

## Introduction

This lecture introduces some of the industry context behind software security.

- ▶ **timeline** of attacks, notifications, responses
- ▶ **security advisories** and **CVE-IDs**
- ▶ implementing a **software security strategy** in an organisation

## Vulnerability and attacks timeline



## Security advisories

Security **advisories** (aka **bulletins**) are issued by software vendors

- ▶ *public* feeds, also *private* at earlier stages
- ▶ advance notification to high-value customers, security companies
  - ▶ maybe before patches are available
  - ▶ **Q. is that a good idea?**
- ▶ public advisory usually when update available
  - ▶ may be *coordinated* among vendors and upstream developers

Various people (sys admins, downstream software devs, users...) should monitor and act on advisories.

## Security advisory format

Each vendor has own format. Typical information:

- ▶ Name, date, unique identification
- ▶ Criticality
- ▶ Affected products
- ▶ Solution

Varying amounts of information given:

- ▶ enough information to construct an exploit?
- ▶ if not, attackers may reverse engineer patches/updates anyway
- ▶ disclosure has to be planned carefully
  - ▶ typically by **coordinated disclosure**

## Advisory we saw last time

Jan. 7, 2014 - Stack buffer overflow in parsing of BDF font files in libXfont

**CVE-2013-6462:** An authenticated X client can cause an X server to read a font file that overflows a buffer on the stack in the X server, potentially leading to crash and/or privilege escalation in setuid servers. The fix is included in libXfont 1.4.7. See the advisory for more details.

## Advisory on xorg-announce

X.Org Security Advisory: CVE-2013-6462: Stack buffer overflow in parsing of BDF font files in libXfont  
Alan Coopersmith alan.coopersmith at oracle.com  
Tue Jan 7 08:43:23 PST 2014

X.Org Security Advisory: January 7, 2014 - CVE-2013-6462  
Stack buffer overflow in parsing of BDF font files in libXfont  
=====

Description:  
=====

Scanning of the libXfont sources with the cppcheck static analyzer included a report of:

```
[lib/libXfont/src/bitmap/bdfread.c:341]: (warning)
    scanf without field width limits can crash with huge input data.
```

## Advisory on Red Hat enterprise-watch-list

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Red Hat Security Advisory

Synopsis:	Important: libXfont security update
Advisory ID:	RHSA-2014:0018-01
Product:	Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Advisory URL:	<a href="https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2014-0018.html">https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2014-0018.html</a>
Issue date:	2014-01-10
CVE Names:	CVE-2013-6462

=====

### 1. Summary:

Updated libXfont packages that fix one security issue are now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and 6.

The Red Hat Security Response Team has rated this update as having important security impact.

...

### 2. Relevant releases/architectures:

RHEL Desktop Workstation (v. 5 client) - i386, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux (v. 5 server) - i386, ia64, ppc, s390x, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 5 client) - i386, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 6) - i386, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop Optional (v. 6) - i386, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node (v. 6) - x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux HPC Node Optional (v. 6) - x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server (v. 6) - i386, ppc64, s390x, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server Optional (v. 6) - i386, ppc64, s390x, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation (v. 6) - i386, x86\_64  
Red Hat Enterprise Linux Workstation Optional (v. 6) - i386, x86\_64

### 3. Description:

The libXfont packages provide the X.Org libXfont runtime library. X.Org is an open source implementation of the X Window System.

A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the way the libXfont library parsed Glyph Bitmap Distribution Format (BDF) fonts. A malicious, local user could exploit this issue to potentially execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the X.Org server. (CVE-2013-6462)

Users of libXfont should upgrade to these updated packages, which contain a backported patch to resolve this issue. All running X.Org server instances must be restarted for the update to take effect.

### 4. Solution:

Before applying this update, make sure all previously-released errata relevant to your system have been applied.

This update is available via the Red Hat Network. Details on how to use the Red Hat Network to apply this update are available at <https://access.redhat.com/kb/docs/DOC-11259>

### 5. Bugs fixed (<https://bugzilla.redhat.com/>):

1048044 - CVE-2013-6462 libXfont: stack-based buffer overflow flaw when parsing Glyph Bitmap Distribution Format (BDF) fonts

### 6. Package List:

Red Hat Enterprise Linux Desktop (v. 5 client):

Source:  
<ftp://ftp.redhat.com/pub/redhat/linux/enterprise/5Client/en/os/SRPMS/>

i386:  
libXfont-1.2.2-1.0.5.el5\_10.i386.rpm  
libXfont-debuginfo-1.2.2-1.0.5.el5\_10.i386.rpm

...  
...

## 7. References:

<https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2013-6462.html>  
<https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/#important>

## 8. Contact:


The Red Hat security contact is <secalert@redhat.com>. More contact details at <https://access.redhat.com/security/team/contact/>

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----  
Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFSz8HSXLSAg2UNWIIIRAv05AJ4976ATNgp8mmoyRg0bDFnCv0P4zACfYwJc  
f9VhkwpGzE3y3jtSD9fupVg=  
=T7Wm  
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## Example: HP Data Protector



HP Support document

SEARCH HP SUPPORT CENTER Rate this content

Help

RELATED LINKS

- HP Software Support Online (IT Management Software)
- HP Customer Care (Home & Home Office products)
- Subscribe to alerts for your product

SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN

Document ID: 0382422  
Version: 1

**HP Data Protector, Remote Increase of Privilege, Denial of Service (DoS), Execution of Arbitrary Code**

**NOTICE:** The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible.

Release Date: 2014-01-02  
Last Updated: 2014-01-02

Potential Security Impact: Remote increase of privilege, Denial of Service (DoS), execution of arbitrary code

Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team

**VULNERABILITY SUMMARY**

Potential security vulnerabilities have been identified with HP Data Protector. These vulnerabilities could be remotely exploited to allow an increase of privilege, create a Denial of Service (DoS), or execute arbitrary code.

**References:**

- CVE-2013-2344 (ZDI-CAN-1866, SSRTI01217)
- CVE-2013-2345 (ZDI-CAN-1869, SSRTI01218)
- CVE-2013-2346 (ZDI-CAN-1870, SSRTI01219)

Figure 1:

## What is HP Data Protector?

**Big data causes big backup challenges**



## How was this vulnerability found?



- ▶ **Zero Day Initiative**, started by TippingPoint, a network security company
  - ▶ part of 3Com, now HP
- ▶ Idea of *crowd-sourcing* vulnerability discovery
- ▶ Finding many vulnerabilities in enterprise software
  - ▶ HP, Microsoft, CISCO, ...
- ▶ Incentive programme rewarding participants
  - ▶ \$ reward, bonuses like DEFCON attendance
  - ▶ advantages: independence, wider knowledge
  - ▶ and presumably cheaper than direct employment

## What is CVE?

- ▶ Started in 1999, originally at **CERT**
  - ▶ CVE = Common Vulnerability *Enumeration*
- ▶ Aim: standardise identification of vulnerabilities
  - ▶ before CVE, each vendor used its own scheme
  - ▶ confusing multiple advisories for same problem
- ▶ Each vendor/distributor has own advisory channel
  - ▶ CVE allows cross referencing, public standard ID
  - ▶ Users or customers can check how CVEs are handled
- ▶ Moved to **MITRE**, a US R& D outfit
  - ▶ CVE = **Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures**
- ▶ ITU-T adopted in 2011 as international recommendation, X.CVE

## Vulnerabilities versus Exposures

- Vulnerability** A mistake that can be used by a hacker to violate a "reasonable" security policy for a system (e.g., executing commands as another user, violating access restrictions, conducting a DoS attack)  
**Example: smurf vulnerability (ping server responds to broadcast address)**
- Exposure** A system configuration issue or mistake in software that can be used by a hacker as a stepping-stone into a system or network, e.g., gathering information, hiding activities.  
**Example: running open 'finger' service; allows attacker to probe network**

## CVE Identifiers

Consist of:

- ▶ CVE ID (number): **CVE-1999-0067**
- ▶ Brief description of vulnerability or exposure
- ▶ References, e.g., to reports or advisories

## CVE IDs

### CVE-ID Syntax Changing on January 1, 2014

*Due to the ever increasing volume of public vulnerability reports, the CVE Editorial Board and MITRE determined that the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE®) project should change the syntax of its standard vulnerability identifiers so that CVE can track more than 10,000 vulnerabilities in a single year.*

## New CVE ID format

**CVE-ID Syntax Change**

Old Syntax	New Syntax
<b>CVE-YYYY-NNNN</b>	<b>CVE-YYYY-NNNN...N</b>
4 fixed digits, supports a maximum of 9,999 unique identifiers per year.	4-digit minimum and no maximum, provides for additional capacity each year when needed.
Fixed 4-Digit Examples	Arbitrary Digits Examples
<b>CVE-1999-0067</b>	<b>CVE-2014-0001</b>
<b>CVE-2005-4873</b>	<b>CVE-2014-12345</b>
<b>CVE-2012-0158</b>	<b>CVE-2014-7654321</b>

YYYY indicates year the ID is issued to a CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) or published.

**Implementation date: January 1, 2014**

Source: <http://cve.mitre.org>

## Creating CVE Identifiers

1. Discover a potential V or E
2. Get a CVE Numbering Authority to give a number
  - ▶ MITRE, big vendors (Apple, Google, MS, Ubuntu,...)
  - ▶ Numbers reserved in blocks; "instantly" available
3. CVE ID number shared among disclosure parties
4. Advisory published, including CVE-ID number
5. MITRE updates master list

Only published CVE-ID Numbers are kept in master list.

## CVE Compatibility

- ▶ Standard for "interoperability" or "comparability"
- ▶ For products and services
- ▶ Has some official requirements certified by MITRE
  - ▶ ownership by legal entity
  - ▶ responsibility, answering to reviews
- ▶ Capability required for tools, web sites
  - ▶ *CVE searchable*
  - ▶ Use standard document formats

## BSIMM



Figure 2:

## BSIMM: Building Security In Maturity Model

- ▶ **BSIMM** is a *Maturity Model* for real-world best practices in software-producing companies
  - ▶ examines *Software Security Initiatives* (SSIs)
  - ▶ provides a “measuring stick”, state-of-the-art
- ▶ Introduced by Gary McGraw and others
  - ▶ Author of *Software Security: Building Security In*
- ▶ Inspired by **Capability Maturity Model (CMM)** (late 80s-90s)
  - ▶ model of software development processes
  - ▶ *maturity* = degree of formality/rigour of process
  - ▶ 5 Levels: *chaotic, repeatable, defined, managed, optimizing*
- ▶ Now at BSIMM-6, October 2015. About 70 orgs.

## BSIMM goals

For organisations starting/running a Software Security Initiative, BSIMM aims to:

- ▶ Inform risk management decisions
- ▶ Clarify “right thing to do” for those involved
- ▶ Reduce costs via standard, repeatable processes
- ▶ Improve code quality

This is done by planning a *Software Security Initiative*, implementing activities selected from BSIMM. Activities can be roled out according to the maturity level of the organisation.

## Implementing a SSI

May be a **serious effort** for a large organisation to implement, and require a big budget.

Large companies can have:

- ▶ tens of thousands of software developers
- ▶ hundreds or thousands of applications in development
- ▶ similarly many applications in deployment or sale

Systematic, explicit organisation of security goals are needed to manage software security effectively.

## The BSIMM Software Security Framework

BSIMM defines a *Software Security Framework* which describes

- ▶ **12 practices** organised into **4 domains**
  - ▶ Governance, Intelligence, Development, Deployment
- ▶ Each practice involves numerous **activities**
- ▶ Each practice split into **maturity levels 1-3**
  - ▶ each maturity level has several activities
- ▶ BSIMM-V covers **112** activities
- ▶ New activities added when they appear in >1 org

## The BSIMM Software Security Framework

### Governance

Management, measurement, training.

**SM** Strategy and Metrics **CP**  
Compliance and Policy **T**  
Training

## The BSIMM Software Security Framework

### Intelligence

Collecting data, issuing guidance, threat modelling

**AM** Attack Models **SFD**  
Security Features and Design **SR**  
Standards and Requirements

## The BSIMM Software Security Framework

### Secure Software Design Lifecycle (SSDL) Touchpoints

Software development artifacts and processes

**AA** Architecture Analysis **CR**  
Code Review **ST**  
Security Testing

## The BSIMM Software Security Framework

### Deployment

Configuration, maintenance, environment security

**PT** Penetration Testing **SE**  
Software Environment **CMVM**  
Configuration Management and Vulnerability  
Management

## Governance: Example maturity levels

**Strategy and Metrics (SM)** maturity levels:

1. Common understanding of direction, strategy
  - ▶ everyone involved in creating software understands written software security goals
  - ▶ company management understand strategy for achieving
2. Align behaviour with strategy
  - ▶ software security leadership roles filled
3. Risk-based portfolio management
  - ▶ top-level management learns about risk for each application

## Governance: Example activities

### SM 1.4: Identify gate locations, gather necessary artifacts

The software security process will involve release gates/checkpoints/milestones at one or more points in the SDLCs. First steps:

1. identify gate locations that are compatible with existing development practices and
2. begin gathering the input necessary for making a go/no go decision.

Importantly at this stage, the gates are not enforced. For example, the SSG can collect security testing results for each project prior to release, but stop short of passing judgment on what constitutes sufficient testing or acceptable test results.

## Governance: Example activities

### SM 2.2: Enforce gates with measurements and track exceptions

SDLC security gates are now enforced: in order to pass a gate, a project must either meet an established measure or obtain a waiver. Even recalcitrant project teams must now play along. The SSG tracks exceptions. A gate could require a project to undergo code review and remediate any critical findings before release. In some cases, gates are directly associated with controls required by regulations, contractual agreements, and other business obligations and exceptions are tracked as required by statutory or regulatory drivers. In other cases, gate measures yield key performance indicators that are used to govern the process.

## Personal experience (2009-): mixed evidence



- ▶ Selling Software Quality tool for safety/security
  - ▶ Java static analysis for concurrency
- ▶ Went into a number of large financial services orgs
- ▶ Found range of maturity levels. . .

## BSIMM-V survey

- ▶ 67 organisations interviewed (over past 24 months)
- ▶ Range of industry sectors
  - ▶ financial services
  - ▶ independent software vendors
  - ▶ cloud, retail, security, healthcare, media, ...
- ▶ Results confidential. Some companies named, e.g.:
  - ▶ Adobe, Intel, McAfee, Microsoft
  - ▶ Bank of America, Capital One, Goldman Sachs, HSBC
  - ▶ PayPal, Visa
  - ▶ Marks and Spencer
- ▶ All orgs operate a **Software Security Group**
  - ▶ responsible for carrying out software security
  - ▶ mix of roles
  - ▶ essential first step: **management buy-in**
- ▶ SSGs quite young (ave 5 years)

## BSIM-V results: score card

Governance		Intelligence		SSDL Touchpoint	
Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed	Activity	Observed
[SM1.1]	44	[AM1.1]	21	[AA1.1]	1
[SM1.2]	34	[AM1.2]	43	[AA1.2]	1
[SM1.3]	34	[AM1.3]	30	[AA1.3]	1
[SM1.4]	57	[AM1.4]	12	[AA1.4]	1
[SM1.6]	36	[AM1.5]	42	[AA2.1]	1
[SM2.1]	26	[AM1.6]	16	[AA2.2]	1
[SM2.2]	31	[AM2.1]	7	[AA2.3]	1
[SM2.3]	27	[AM2.2]	11	[AA3.1]	1
[SM2.5]	20	[AM3.1]	4	[AA3.2]	1
[SM3.1]	16	[AM3.2]	6		
[SM3.2]	6				

Figure 3:

## BSIM-V results: average best practice




Figure 4:

- ▶ uses spider diagram to show the “high watermark” in each of the 12 practices, i.e., the highest maturity level achieved
- ▶ for set of companies, take average high watermark

## BSIM-V results: top 10




Figure 5:

## BSIM-V results: sector comparison




Figure 6:

## BSIM-V results: core activity in each practice

- SM1.4** identify gate locations, to establish SSDL gates
- CP1.2** identify Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
- T1.1** provide security awareness training to promote culture of security
- AM1.2** create data classification scheme and inventory, to prioritise applications
- SFD1.1** build and publish security features to create guidance, proactively
- SR1.1** create security standards to meet demand for security features

- AA1.1 perform security feature review to get started with architecture analysis CR1.4
  - use automated tools along with manual review to drive efficiency/consistency ST1.3
  - drive tests with security requirements and security features to start security testing in familiar functional territory
- PT1.1 use external penetration testers to find problems to demonstrate that your organization's code needs help too SE1.2
  - ensure host and network security basics are in place to provide a solid host/network foundation for software CMVM1.2
  - identify software bugs found in operations monitoring and feed them back to development to use ops data to change dev behavior

## BSIM-6 new activity

### CMVM 3.4: Operate a bug bounty program

The organization solicits vulnerability reports from external researchers and pays a bounty for each verified and accepted vulnerability received. Payouts typically follow a sliding scale linked to multiple factors, such as vulnerability type (e.g., remote code execution is worth \$10,000 versus CSRF is worth \$750), exploitability (demonstrable exploits command much higher payouts), or specific services and software versions (widely-deployed or critical services warrant higher payouts). Ad hoc or short-duration activities, such as capture-the-flag contests, do not count. (6% of survey operate such a programme in Oct 2015)

## What was covered

From the outside:

- ▶ the vulnerability and attack process
- ▶ security advisories and CVEs

From the inside:

- ▶ **BSIMM**: a best-practice model for a *Software Security Initiative*
- ▶ some of the activities in BSIMM
- ▶ state-of-the-art: results of the BSIMM-V survey

In later lectures we'll return to CVEs and some of the SSDLC and Deployment activities in BSIM.

## Next time

Next time we'll start looking at some **overflow vulnerabilities** in more detail.