Reliable Agent Systems

This lecture looks more closely at reliability of agent systems in an open environment:

- Why this is difficult but (maybe) important.
- Two short examples showing how a small change in our formal view alters practice.
- Different ways of assessing reliability.

Many SE/KE technologies/methods *could* apply. The issue is how they can be applied effectively.

Reminder: Demand v Supply

"What is particularly impressive is the way that scientists are now undaunted by important complex phenomena...The emerging field of escience should transform this kind of work...One of the pilot e-science projects is to develop a digital mammographic archive, together with an intelligent medical decision support system for breast cancer diagnosis and treatment....So the surgeon in the operating room will be able to pull up a high-resolution mammogram to identify exactly where the tumour can be found."

Tony Blair, Speech to Royal Society, 23rd May 2002

"Design and Development: Software Architecture Design... Artificial Intelligence...NR [Not Recommended]"

IEC 61508 standard for safety-related software

Reliability for Traditional Systems

A traditional form of reliability estimation:

- Define the boundaries of the system.
- Identify the components within these boundaries.
- Assess the reliability of each component under the range of operating conditions expected.
- Estimate the overall reliability as some function of component reliabilities and their interactions.
- Use this stable reliability estimate for the system whenever it is run.

Reliability for Agent Systems

The Semantic Web (and related Grid initiatives) assumes:

- Characterisation of components via a "semantic layer" (DAML-S, *etc*).
- Incremental and evolving characterisation.
- Standardisation only at interfaces between components (protocols, ontology mappings, *etc*).
- Context for evaluating "truth" of information is not always static.

No boundary. No definitive measure of dependability. No stability over time.

An Example

- It is believed to be impossible now for medical practitioners to know all they should know.
- In some sub-disciplines (e.g. oncology) automated support is being provided via decision support systems.
- These are now being made available as components (open source) via Web portals.
- The legal position in doing this is unclear. There is a duty of care in medicine. Normal medical safety arguments ("the patient would have died anyway") won't work. Normal defence in depth arguments won't work.
- So how do we make a safety case for such systems?

Some Reliability Issues



Interaction Control

An auction without social conventions...



Current Standard Practice

Build into each agent:

- Its interaction strategy.
- Its algorithm for deciding how interaction strategy translates into message passing.
- Its decision procedures.
- This doesn't scale because:
 - We must predict all the interactions for each agent.
 - The resulting code is complex.
- We must change it whenever the implementation platform or communication environment changes.
- This change may have an impact on other agents.

Reliable Interaction Control

Agents must operate independently but their interactions must be reliable. Conversation shouldn't require preparation by all involved.

- Solution 1: Performative languages
- Solution 2: Global controllers.
- Solution 3: Proxies.
- Solution 4: The protocol is in the message.











More Complex Example



Interaction Protocol

agent(Scene, Type, Name) ::= InputMessage1 <= Agent1 then (OutputMessage1 => Agent2 par OutputMessage2 => Agent3) then agent(NewScene, NewType, Name).

agent(referral, diagnostician, D) ::=

request(diagnosis,_) <= agent(external, patient, P) then request(clinical_interview,_) => agent(diagnosis, interviewer, I) then offer(clinical_information,_) <= agent(diagnosis, interviewer, I) then offer(diagnosis, _) => agent(external, patient, P) then agent(referral, diagnostician, D).

Reactions

agent(Scene, Type, Name) :: InputMessage <= Agent1 \rightarrow Actions.

agent(referral, diagnostician, _) :: request(diagnosis,D) <= agent(external, patient, P) → believe(diagnosis_request(P, D)).

Proactions

agent(Scene, Type, Name) :: OutputMessage => Agent1 < Conditions.

agent(referral, diagnostician, _) :: offer(diagnosis, D) => agent(external, patient, P) ← decision(referral_decision(P), D).

Separation of Concerns

For each form of dialogue define a protocol:

- Define interaction protocol.
- Define proaction and reaction constraints.
- For different interaction environments:
 - Build the software for transporting protocols.
- For different agent implementation platforms:
 - Build the software for en/de-coding protocols.

For each agent:

Build decision procedures for pro/re-actions.

Reliability: Process



Reliability: Proof

Proofs of properties seem attractive. e.g. Every time there's a request for a referral there will be an offer of diagnosis to the patient.

But we can prove this only with assumptions about the agents involved (e.g. that decision(referral_decision(P), D) always succeeds).

Component reliability can only be determined at deployment time so vendor has to provide a reliability function, not static evaluation.

Reliability:Testing

How do we test specific behaviours? One way is to simulate.

agent(referral, diagnostician, D) ::= request(diagnosis,_) <= agent(external, patient, P) then request(clinical_interview,_) => agent(diagnosis, interviewer, I) then offer(clinical_information,_) <= agent(diagnosis, interviewer, I) then offer(diagnosis, _) => agent(external, patient, P) then agent(referral, diagnostician, D).

e.g. Every time there's a request for a referral there will be an offer of diagnosis to the patient *in reasonable time*.

Reliability: Experimentation

How do we predict population-level behaviours? One way is multi-agent simulation.

e.g. Can we invent a dialogue protocol which significantly reduced mean waiting time between presentation of symptoms and diagnosis.

Requires a "laboratory" for rapid modelling of large agent systems.

