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2010 US Congressional Control Market



liquidation time!



previously ...



We consider a prediction market on a finite set K of outcomes with a finite set M of agents.

- An agent $m \in M$ is a pair (β_m, ϕ_m) where:
- $\beta_m \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is the wealth of agent m
- $\phi_m^k(c) \in [0,1]$ is the fraction of β_m that agent m bets on outcome k
- and $c_k \in [0, 1]$ is the price of the contract that wins \$1 if the outcome is k

$0 \le c_k \le 1$

total investment

total investment of agent m is $\beta_m \sum_k \phi_m^k(c)$

 $\sum_k \phi_m^k \le 1$

updated budget per agent

$$\beta'_m / \beta_m = 1 - \sum_k \phi_m^k(c) + c_y^{-1} \cdot \phi_m^y(c)$$
$$\sum_k \phi_m^k = 1?$$

market balance, fusion of beliefs

$$c_y \cdot \sum_{m,k} \beta_m \phi_m^k(c) = \sum_m \beta_m \phi_m^y(c)$$

i.

$$c_y = n_y(c)/n(c)$$

$$\sum_{k} c_k = 1$$

total bet on k, total bet
$$n_k(c) := \sum_m \beta_m \phi_m^k(c)$$
$$n(c) := \sum_k n_k(c)$$

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reasonable conditions for existence and unicity of a market balancing price

assumptions about agents

We suppose that ϕ_m^k is such that:

- it only depends on c_k
- $-\phi_m^k(0) > 0$
- $-\phi_m^k(1) = 0$
- ϕ_m^k continuous and decreasing on [0, 1]

construction

$$f_k(x) = x^{-1} \cdot n_k(x)$$
 is a continuous and strictly decreasing bijection from $[0, 1]$ to $[0, +\infty]$.

$$n_k(c) := \sum_m \beta_m \phi_m^k(c)$$

$$n(c) := \sum_k n_k(c)$$

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existence of price

Define an endomap of $[0, 1]^K$ as:

$$F_y(c) = f_y^{-1}(\sum_k n_k(c_k)) = f_y^{-1}(n(c))$$

- $F_y(c) \leq 1$ with equality if $c = 1, 0 < F_y(0) < 1$,
- F is a continuous and strictly increasing function
- the iterated sequence $F^n(\mathbf{0})$ is strictly increasing in all coordinates
- as it is bounded it converges to a fixed point c^\star
- c^* is a solution to the market balance such that $\sum c_k^* = 1$

$$n(c^{\star}) = \sum_{k} n_k(c_k^{\star}) = f_y(c^{\star}) = 1/c^{\star} \cdot n_y(c^{\star})$$

the market "procedure" (2)

One can think of $c' = F_y(c)$ as the new market price subsequent to a transaction; this assignment verifies that for all ys, $1/c'_y \cdot n_y(c') = n(c)$, where the lhs is what the market owes if y happens, and the rhs is an under-approximation of the total bet. Note that this does not suppose that the market knows what the ϕ_m^k s are; as one can define c'_y as the ratio between the total current bet on y and the total bet