

Decision Making *in Robots and Autonomous Agents*

Learning about Preferences
(based on material by C. Boutilier, D. Braziunas)



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Preference Elicitation in AI

Shopping for a Car:

*Luggage Capacity?
Two Door? Cost?
Engine Size?
Color? Options?*



The Preference Bottleneck

- *Preference elicitation:*
the process of determining a user's preferences/
utilities to the extent necessary to make a decision
on her behalf
- Why a bottleneck?
 - preferences vary widely
 - large (multiattribute) outcome spaces
 - quantitative utilities (the “numbers”) difficult to assess

Automated Preference Elicitation

- Questions:
 - decomposition of preferences
 - what preference information is *relevant* to the task at hand?
 - when is the elicitation effort *worth the improvement* it offers in terms of decision quality?
 - what *decision criterion* to use given partial utility information?

Constraint-based Decision Problems

- Constraint-based optimization (CBO):
 - outcomes over variables $\mathbf{X} = \{X_1 \dots X_n\}$
 - constraints \mathbf{C} over \mathbf{X} spell out feasible decisions
 - generally compact structure, e.g., $X_1 \& X_2 \supset \neg X_3$
 - add a *utility function* $u: \text{Dom}(\mathbf{X}) \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$
 - preferences over configurations

Constraint-based Decision Problems

- Must express u compactly like \mathbf{C}
 - *generalized additive independence (GAI)*
 - model proposed by Fishburn (1967)
 - nice generalization of additive linear models
 - expressible by graphical model capturing independence

Additive Linear Models of Utility

$$u(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i(x_i) = \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i v_i(x_i).$$

$\lambda_1 = 0.2$		$\lambda_2 = 0.3$		$\lambda_3 = 0.5$	
Color	u_1	Drs	u_2	Pwr	u_3
red	1.0	2	1.0	350	1.0
blue	0.7	4	0.8	280	0.7
grey	0.0	hatch	0.2	150	0.0
		wag'n	0.0		

$$u(\text{red}, 2\text{dr}, 280\text{hp}) = 0.85$$

Additive Utility

- An additive representation of u exists iff decision maker is indifferent between any two lotteries where the marginals over each attribute are identical
 - $I_1(\mathbf{X}) \sim I_2(\mathbf{X})$ whenever $I_1(X_i) = I_2(X_i)$ for all X_i


$$u(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i(x_i) = \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i v_i(x_i).$$

Factored Utilities: GAI Models


- Set of K factors f_k over subset of variables $\mathbf{X}[k]$
 - “local” utility for each local configuration

$$- u(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{k \leq K} f_k(\mathbf{x}[k])$$

$$\frac{f_1(A)}{a: 3 \\ \bar{a}: 1}$$



$$\frac{f_2(B)}{b: 3 \\ \bar{b}: 1}$$




$$\frac{f_3(BC)}{bc: 12 \\ b\bar{c}: 2 \\ \dots}$$

$$u(abc) = f_1(a) + f_2(b) + f_3(bc)$$

- [Fishburn67] u in this form exists iff
 - lotteries p and q are equally preferred whenever p and q have the same marginals over each $\mathbf{X}[k]$

Optimization with GAI Models

$$u(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{k \leq K} f^k(\mathbf{x}[k])$$



- Optimize using Integer Programming (or, e.g., Variable Elimination)
 - number of variables *linear* in size of GAI model

$$\max_{\{I_{\mathbf{x}[k]}, X_i\}} \sum_k \sum_{\mathbf{x}[k] \in \text{Dom}(\mathbf{X}[k])} u_{\mathbf{x}[k]} I_{\mathbf{x}[k]} \quad \text{subj. to } A, C$$

Difficulties in CBO

- **Utility elicitation:** how do we assess individual user preferences?
 - need to elicit GAI model structure (independence)
 - need to elicit (constraints on) GAI parameters
 - need to make decisions with imprecise parameters


Strict Utility Function Uncertainty

- User's actual utility u unknown
- Assume *feasible set* $F \subseteq U = [0,1]^n$
 - allows for unquantified or “strict” uncertainty
 - e.g., F a set of linear constraints on GAI terms

$$u(\text{red}, 2\text{door}, 280\text{hp}) > 0.4$$
$$u(\text{red}, 2\text{door}, 280\text{hp}) > u(\text{blue}, 2\text{door}, 280\text{hp})$$

- How should one make a decision? elicit info?

Strict Uncertainty Representation



Utility Function


Bayesian Utility Function Uncertainty

- User's actual utility u unknown
- Assume *density* P over $U = [0,1]^n$
- Given *belief state* P , EU of decision x is:

$$EU(x, P) = \int_{\vec{u}} \vec{p}_x \vec{u} P(\vec{u})$$

- Decision making is easy, but elicitation harder?
 - query must assess *expected value of information*


Bayesian Representation



Utility Function


Query Types

- *Comparison queries* (is \mathbf{x} preferred to \mathbf{x}' ?)
 - impose linear constraints on parameters
 - $\sum_k f_k(\mathbf{x}[k]) > \sum_k f_k(\mathbf{x}'[k])$
 - Interpretation is straightforward



Query Types

- *Bound queries* (is $f_k(\mathbf{x}[k]) > v$?)
 - response tightens bound on specific utility parameter
 - can be phrased as a *local standard gamble query*



Difficulties with Bound Queries

- Bound queries focus on *local* factors
 - but values cannot be fixed without reference to others!
 - seemingly “different” local prefs correspond to same u

$$u(\text{Color}, \text{Doors}, \text{Power}) = u_1(\text{Color}, \text{Doors}) + u_2(\text{Doors}, \text{Power})$$

10	6	1	4	9
$u(\text{red}, 2\text{door}, 280\text{hp}) =$	$u_1(\text{red}, 2\text{door})$	+	$u_2(2\text{door}, 280\text{hp})$	
6	3		3	
$u(\text{red}, 4\text{door}, 280\text{hp}) =$	$u_1(\text{red}, 4\text{door})$	+	$u_2(4\text{door}, 280\text{hp})$	

Local Queries [BB05]

- We wish to avoid queries on whole outcomes
 - can't ask purely local outcomes
 - but can condition on a *subset* of default values
- *Conditioning set* $C(f)$ for factor $f_i(\mathbf{X}_i)$:
 - variables that share factors with \mathbf{X}_i
 - setting default outcomes on $C(f)$ renders \mathbf{X}_i independent of remaining variables
 - enables local calibration of factor values

Local Standard Gamble Queries

- Local std. gamble queries
 - use “best” and “worst” (anchor) **local** outcomes
 - conditioned on default values of conditioning set
 - bound queries on other parameters relative to these
 - gives *local value function* $v(x[i])$ (e.g., $v(ABC)$)
- Hence we can legitimately ask **local** queries:

$$(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}_{C_i}^0) \sim \langle p, (\mathbf{x}_i^\top, \mathbf{x}_{C_i}^0); 1 - p, (\mathbf{x}_i^\perp, \mathbf{x}_{C_i}^0) \rangle$$

- But local Value Functions not enough:
 - must calibrate: requires global scaling

Global Scaling

- Elicit utilities of anchor outcomes *with respect to* global best and worst outcomes
 - the $2 \cdot m$ “best” and “worst” outcomes for each factor
 - these require *global* standard gamble queries
(*note: same is true for pure additive models*)

Bound Query Strategies

- Identify conditioning sets C_i for each factor f_i
- Decide on “default” outcome
- For each f_i identify top and bottom *anchors*
 - e.g., the most and least preferred values of factor i
 - given default values of C_i
- Queries available:
 - local std gambles: use anchors for each factor, C-sets
 - global std gambles: gives bounds on anchor utilities

Partial preference information

Bayesian uncertainty




- Probability distribution p over utility functions
- Maximize expected (expected) utility
 - MEU decision $x^* = \arg \max_x E_p [u(x)]$
- Consider:
 - elicitation costs
 - values of possible decisions
 - optimal tradeoffs between elicitation effort and improvement in decision quality

Query selection


- At each step of elicitation process, we can
 - obtain more preference information
 - make or recommend a terminal decision

Bayesian approach

Myopic EVOI



Expected Value of Information



- $MEU(p) = E_p [u(x^*)]$
- **Expected posterior utility:** $EPU(q,p) = E_{r|q,p} [MEU(p^r)]$
- **Expected value of information of query q :**
$$EVOI(q) = EPU(q,p) - MEU(p)$$

Bayesian approach

Myopic EVOI

- Ask query with highest **EVOI - cost**
- [Chajewska et al '00]
 - **Global standard gamble queries (SGQ)**
“Is $u(o_i) > I$?”
 - **Multivariate Gaussian** distributions over utilities
- [Braziunas and Boutilier '05]
 - **Local Std. Gamble Query** over utility factors
 - **Mixture of uniforms** distributions over utilities

Local elicitation in GAI models

[Braziunas and Boutilier '05]

$$u(\mathbf{x}) = u_1(\mathbf{x}_{I_1}) + \dots + u_m(\mathbf{x}_{I_m})$$

- Local elicitation procedure
 - Bayesian uncertainty over local factors
 - Myopic EVOI query selection $\langle \mathbf{x}_i, l \rangle$
- Local comparison query

“Is local value of factor setting x_i greater than l ”?

 - Binary comparison query
 - Requires **yes/no** response
 - query point l can be optimized analytically

Preference Elicitation as POMDP

- States?
 - Utility function, U
- Belief states?
 - Probability distributions over U (which is n -dim continuous space)
- Actions?
 - Queries Q and decisions D
 - Queries induce no change in the underlying system state u , but do provide information
 - Each decision d is a terminal action
- There is a cost for asking questions, $c(q)$

Preference Elicitation as POMDP, contd.

- $Reward(d, u) = EU(d, u)$
- Sensor Model?
 - Response Model $P(r_q|q, u)$
- Value expressions:

$$V^*(P) = \max_{a \in A} Q_a^*(P)$$

$$Q_i^*(l, P) = c(q_i(l)) + \gamma \sum_{r \in R} \Pr(r|q_i(l), P) V^*(P_r)$$