Discrete Mathematics & Mathematical Reasoning Multiplicative Inverses and Some Cryptography

Colin Stirling

Informatics

Some slides based on ones by Myrto Arapinis

Colin Stirling (Informatics)

Discrete Mathematics (Chap 4)

Today 1 / 13

Multiplicative inverses

Theorem

If m, x are positive integers and gcd(m, x) = 1 then x has a multiplicative inverse modulo m (and it is unique modulo m)

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Multiplicative inverses

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Proof.

Consider the sequence of *m* numbers 0, x, 2x, ..., (m-1)x. We first show that these are all distinct modulo *m*.

To verify the above claim, suppose that $ax \mod m = bx \mod m$ for two distinct values a, b in the range $0 \le a, b \le m - 1$. Then we would have $(a - b)x \equiv 0 \pmod{m}$, or equivalently, (a - b)x = km for some integer k. But since x and m are relatively prime, it follows that a - b must be an integer multiple of m. This is not possible since a, b are distinct non-negative integers less than m.

Now, since there are only *m* distinct values modulo *m*, it must then be the case that $ax \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$ for exactly one a (modulo *m*). This a is the unique multiplicative inverse.

Chinese remainder theorem

Theorem

Let $m_1, m_2, ..., m_n$ be pairwise relatively prime positive integers greater than 1 and $a_1, a_2, ..., a_n$ be arbitrary integers. Then the system

 $\begin{array}{l} x \equiv a_1 \; (mod \; m_1) \\ x \equiv a_2 \; (mod \; m_2) \\ \vdots \\ x \equiv a_n \; (mod \; m_n) \end{array}$

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In the book

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- $x = 140 + 63 + 75 = 278 \equiv 68 \pmod{105}$

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Fermat's little theorem

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If p is prime and p $\not|a$, then $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$. Furthermore, for every integer a we have $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$

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Proof.

Assume $p \not| a$ and so, therefore, gcd(p, a) = 1. Then $a, 2a, \ldots, (p-1)a$ are not pairwise congruent modulo p; if $ia \equiv ja \pmod{p}$ then (i - j)a = pm for some m which is impossible (as then $i \equiv j \pmod{p}$) using last result from slides of Lecture 11). Therefore, each element $ja \mod p$ is a distinct element in the set $\{1, \ldots, p-1\}$. This means that the product $a \cdot 2a \cdots (p-1)a \equiv 1 \cdot 2 \cdots p - 1 \pmod{p}$. Therefore, $(p-1)!a^{p-1} \equiv (p-1)! \pmod{p}$. Now because gcd(p,q) = 1 for $1 \leq q \leq p - 1$ it follows that $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$. Therefore, also $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$ and when p|a then clearly $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$.

Computing the remainders modulo prime *p*

• Find 7²²² mod 11

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Computing the remainders modulo prime p

Find 7²²² mod 11

• By Fermat's little theorem, we know that $7^{10} \equiv 1 \pmod{11}$, and so $(7^{10})^k \equiv 1 \pmod{11}$ for every positive integer *k*. Therefore, $7^{222} = 7^{22 \cdot 10 + 2} = (7^{10})^{22} 7^2 \equiv 1^{22} 49 \equiv 5 \pmod{11}$. Hence, $7^{222} \mod 11 = 5$

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• $2^{340} \equiv 1 \pmod{11}$ because $2^{10} \equiv 1 \pmod{11}$

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- The challenge: De can't be feasibly computed from En; and given *En(M)* one can't feasibly compute *M*

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- There are quick algorithms for testing whether a large integer is prime
- There is no known quick algorithm that can factorise a large integer
- Very significant open problem: how hard is it to factorise integers?

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RSA: key generation

• Choose two distinct prime numbers *p* and *q*

- Let n = pq and k = (p 1)(q 1)
- Choose integer *e* where 1 < e < k and gcd(e, k) = 1
- (*n*, *e*) is released as the public key
- Let *d* be the multiplicative inverse of *e* modulo *k*, so *de* ≡ 1 (mod *k*)
- (n, d) is the private key and kept secret

RSA: encryption and decryption

Alice transmits her public key (n, e) to Bob and keeps the private key secret

Encryption If Bob wishes to send message *M* to Alice.

- He turns *M* into an integer *m*, such that $0 \le m < n$ by using an agreed-upon reversible protocol known as a padding scheme
- Provide the computes the ciphertext *c* corresponding to $c = m^e \mod n$. (This can be done quickly)
- Bob transmits c to Alice.

Decryption Alice can recover *m* from *c* by

- Using her private key exponent *d* via computing $m = c^d \mod n$
- Given *m*, she can recover the original message *M* by reversing the padding scheme

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- So, 1819¹³ mod 2537 = 2081 and 1415¹³ mod 2537 = 2182
- So encrypted message is 2081 2182

RSA: correctness of decryption

Given that $c = m^e \mod n$, is $m = c^d \mod n$?

$$c^d = (m^e)^d \equiv m^{ed} \pmod{n}$$

By construction, *d* and *e* are each others multiplicative inverses modulo *k*, i.e. $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{k}$. Also k = (p-1)(q-1). Thus ed - 1 = h(p-1)(q-1) for some integer *h*. We consider $m^{ed} \mod p$ If $p \not\mid m$ then $m^{ed} = m^{h(p-1)(q-1)}m = (m^{p-1})^{h(q-1)}m \equiv 1^{h(q-1)}m \equiv m \pmod{p}$ (by Fermat's little theorem) Otherwise $m^{ed} \equiv 0 \equiv m \pmod{p}$ Symmetrically, $m^{ed} \equiv m \pmod{p}$ Since *p*, *q* are distinct primes, we have $m^{ed} \equiv m \pmod{pq}$. Since n = pq, we have $c^d = m^{ed} \equiv m \pmod{n}$

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