Cryptographic hash functions

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$\mathsf{Encryption} \Rightarrow \mathsf{confidentiality} \text{ against eavesdropping}$

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What about authenticity and integrity against an active attacker? \longrightarrow cryptographic hash functions and Message authentication codes

 \longrightarrow this lecture

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Multiplication of large primes IS a OWF: integer factorization is a hard problem - given $p \times q$ (where p and

q are primes) it is hard to retrieve p and $q_{(n)} \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$

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The successor function in \mathbb{N} IS a CRF the predecessor of a positive integer is unique

Multiplication of large primes IS a CRF: every positive integer has a unique prime factorization

Cryptographic hash functions

A cryptographic hash function takes messages of arbitrary length end returns a fixed-size bit string such that any change to the data will (with very high probability) change the corresponding hash value.

Definition (Cryptographic hash function)

A cryptographic hash function $H: \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{T}$ is a function that satisfies the following 4 properties:

- $\bullet |\mathcal{M}| >> |\mathcal{T}|$
- ▶ it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message
- ▶ it is hard to retrieve a message from it hashed value (OWF)
- it is hard to find two different messages with the same hash value (CRF)

Examples: MD4, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, Whirlpool, ...

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- Building block of other crypto primitives Used to build MACs, block ciphers, PRG, ...

Collision resistance and the birthday attack


Theorem

Let $H: \mathcal{M} \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a cryptographic hash function $(|\mathcal{M}| >> 2^n)$ Generic algorithm to find a collision in time $O(2^{n/2})$ hashes: 1. Choose $2^{n/2}$ random messages in $\mathcal{M}: m_1, \ldots, m_{2^{n/2}}$ 2. For $i = 1, \ldots, 2^{n/2}$ compute $t_i = H(m_i)$ 3. If there exists a collision $(\exists i, j. t_i \neq t_j)$ then return (t_i, t_j) else go back to 1

<u>Proof:</u> (details on the board) the expected number of iteration is 2 \Rightarrow running time $O(2^{n/2})$

⇒ Cryptographic function used in new projects should have an output size $n \ge 256!$

The Merkle-Damgard construction



- Compression function: $h: \mathcal{T} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{T}$
- ► Padding Block (PB): 1000...0||mes-len

(add extra block if needed)

Example of MD constructions: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2, ...

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Theorem

Let H be built using the MD construction to the compression function h. If H admits a collision, so does h.


Proof: (details on the board)

Compression functions from block ciphers

Let E : $\mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a block cipher


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
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Example of cryptographic hash function: SHA-256

- Structure: Merkle-Damgard
- Compression function: Davies-Meyer
- Bloc cipher: SHACAL-2



Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

Goal: message integrity



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A MAC is a pair of algorithms (S, V) defined over $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{T})$:


- $S: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{T}$
- $V: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{T} \to \{\top, \bot\}$
- Consistency: V(k, m, S(k, m)) = T

and such that

► It is hard to computer a valid pair (m, S(k, m)) without knowing k

File system protection

At installation time



k derived from user password

- ► To check for virus file tampering/alteration:
 - reboot to clean OS
 - supply password
 - any file modification will be detected

Let (E, D) be a block cipher. We build a MAC (S, V) using (E, D) as follows:

•
$$S(k, m) = E(k, m)$$

• $V(k, m, t) = \text{if } m = D(k, t)$
then return \top
else return \bot

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But: block ciphers can usually process only 128 or 256 bits


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Our goal now: construct MACs for long messages

ECBC-MAC




- $E: \ \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ a block cipher
- ECBC-MAC : $\mathcal{K}^2 \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$
- \rightarrow the last encryption is crucial to avoid forgeries!!

(details on the board)

Ex: 802.11i uses AES based ECBC-MAC

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PMAC




- $E: \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ a block cipher
- ▶ $P: \ \mathcal{K} \times \mathbb{N} \to \{0,1\}^n$ any easy to compute function
- $PMAC: \mathcal{K}^2 \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$
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MAC built from cryptographic hash functions

 $HMAC(k, m) = H(k \oplus OP||H(k \oplus IP||m))$

IP, OP: publicly known padding constants



Ex: SSL, IPsec, SSH, ...